

PART 5 FUNDRAISING AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL PARTIES AND ADMINISTRATIONS

Chapter 29: Democratic Contributor Access to the White House

From 1993 through 1996, the Democratic National Committee organized numerous events to which it invited supporters of the Democratic Party and their guests. Many DNC events were held inside the White House complex and were attended by the President or Vice President. For those events, the DNC generated guest lists and forwarded names of attendees to the White House Office of Political Affairs, which generally did not conduct an independent review of the list. On several occasions, the DNC asked for additional information about persons under consideration for invitations to White House events. In these situations, the White House Office of Political Affairs forwarded the request to the National Security Council (“NSC”) or other knowledgeable White House staff for recommendations regarding the individual’s attending an event with the President or Vice President.

The Committee investigated the procedures used by the White House to assess and approve individuals invited by the DNC to attend events in the White House.

FINDINGS

(1) From 1993 through 1996, White House procedures for assessing and approving individuals invited by the DNC to attend events in the White House were similar to the procedures used by prior administrations, but such procedures were inadequate. The White House Office of Political Affairs relied on the DNC (and in prior administrations, the RNC) to assess the appropriateness of attendees at DNC (RNC) events at which the President was present. Unfortunately, from 1993 through 1996, the DNC did not adequately perform that function.

(2) When asked to provide information regarding the foreign policy implications arising from DNC-organized events, the National Security Council performed its function. Unfortunately, prior to 1997, the White House did not have a formal structure to adequately assess and approve all attendees at DNC events where the President was present.

INTRODUCTION

For DNC events held in the White House, the Secret Service Agency and the White House Office of Political Affairs are responsible for assessing DNC guests in order to both guard the physical security of the President and to protect the integrity of the Office of the Presidency and the policies of the United States. Before an individual may enter the White House complex,

Secret Service officials conduct a background check to determine whether the individual poses a physical threat to the President or White House staff. To determine whether an individual is otherwise appropriate to attend DNC events at the White House, the White House Office of Political Affairs is responsible for obtaining and approving DNC proposed guest lists. From 1993 through 1996, the White House Office of Political Affairs followed the practice of previous administrations and relied on the judgment of its national party to provide appropriate information about political supporters scheduled to attend White House events. According to the testimony of an 18-year career White House employee, administrations have handled invitations to RNC and DNC events at the White House in the same way as the current Administration handled similar invitations from 1993 through 1996.¹ When questions were raised by the party about possible negative implications of the event or specific attendees, the White House Office of Political Affairs sought relevant information from the NSC and other knowledgeable White House staff in order to make appropriate decisions.

This section discusses the Committee's investigation of the White House procedures used to assess and approve individuals invited by the DNC to attend events inside the White House complex, focusing on the functions of the Secret Service, the White House Office of Political Affairs and the National Security Council.

THE SECRET SERVICE

The Secret Service is responsible for the physical security of the White House complex, which consists of the New Executive Office Building, the Old Executive Office Building, and the White House itself, as well as the physical security of certain White House officials, particularly the President and Vice President.

Visitors to the White House complex, except for individuals on public tours, are screened by the Secret Service through a process known as "WAVES," which stands for Worker and Visitor Entrance System. In order for an individual to enter the White House complex under the WAVES system, an employee of the White House must first submit a computer message to the Secret Service requesting that the individual be admitted to the complex on a specified day and time. In response, a Secret Service officer conducts a name check on the individual through the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), which contains criminal history and warrant information.² If the officer does not discover pertinent criminal information about the individual, the officer clears the individual for entrance through one of the secured gates of the complex.

If the NCIC check does yield pertinent information on a requested individual, the officer conveys that information to a Secret Service supervisor.³ The supervisor is responsible for reviewing the information to determine whether the individual's entrance into the White House complex may pose a physical threat to the President or Vice President, or to the White House complex generally.⁴ In making this determination, the supervisor focuses on whether the information suggests that the individual may be violent, dangerous, or in other ways may present a

physical or security threat.⁵ If the supervisor determines that the individual should not be admitted to the White House for these reasons, the supervisor prohibits clearance for the individual and notifies the White House employee who had requested that the individual be admitted that no clearance would be granted.⁶ The Secret Service does not convey the basis of this decision to White House staff.⁷ The Secret Service does not assess or make admittance determinations based on issues involving the general appropriateness of an individual entering the White House or meeting with the President or Vice President.⁸ These Secret Service procedures have been in effect since 1984.⁹

The responsibility of the Secret Service for screening potential White House visitors, including guests invited by the DNC, is therefore limited to an assessment of whether the individual may pose a physical threat to the White House complex or to the President or Vice President.¹⁰ This narrow review is supplemented by other determinations made independently by the White House Office of Political Affairs and the NSC.

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

DNC officials seeking to organize events on the White House grounds coordinate with the White House Office of Political Affairs. From 1993 to 1997, the DNC organized these events by coordinating schedules and other logistics with the White House Office of Political Affairs, and by forwarding a list of proposed attendees for each event.¹¹ During this time period, it is not clear what procedures were used inside the DNC for assessing the appropriateness of the list of event attendees before it was forwarded to the White House Office of Political Affairs. DNC Finance Chairman Richard Sullivan testified that it was his understanding that DNC staff within the Finance Division was responsible for compiling the lists and raising any potential problems with the White House at the time it forwarded the attendance list to the Office of Political Affairs.¹² Although the evidence presented to the Committee demonstrates that the DNC staff did, on occasion, raise such questions with the White House, problems arose when the DNC did not raise questions about certain events or individuals with White House officials.¹³

According to Karen Hancox, the Deputy Director of the White House Office of Political Affairs, the DNC normally forwarded the list of proposed attendees for DNC sponsored events via facsimile the night before the event.¹⁴ Hancox testified that the lists did not contain information about past or promised contributions by the invitees,¹⁵ and that her office generally did not conduct an independent assessment of the individuals for general appropriateness unless an issue about a particular individual or event was raised by the DNC staff.¹⁶

If an issue was raised by the DNC, Hancox testified that her office would seek additional information on the matter from the NSC or other knowledgeable White House staff.¹⁷ Hancox testified that she made approximately 12 such inquiries of the NSC.¹⁸ She also testified that her office strictly adhered to the NSC's response regarding whether there may be any negative implications if a particular person entered the White House or attended a DNC event with the President or Vice President. Hancox testified that, "If [the NSC] said no, it was no."¹⁹ The

White House and the NSC made these determinations on an event by event basis, and did not compile a list of individuals who had previously been denied access to DNC events.

Judith Spangler, a White House career employee testified that during her 18-year tenure, administrations have handled invitations to RNC and DNC events at the White House in the same way that the current Administration handled similar invitations from 1993 to 1997.²⁰

Ultimately, from 1993 through 1996, the procedures employed by the White House Office of Political Affairs permitted DNC staff to largely determine on its own who would attend White House events organized and sponsored by the DNC.²¹ Unfortunately, the DNC did not have an adequate system of checking the appropriateness of individuals attending events with the President or Vice President and also did not raise questions about certain individuals or events that would have permitted the White House or the NSC to provide input on whether such attendees were advisable. For details regarding the specific incidents that derived from this system, see Chapters 25, 30 and 31 of this Minority Report.

In 1997, both the DNC and the White House implemented policies to formalize their procedures for assessing potential guests at most DNC sponsored events. The DNC now requires that all individuals invited to DNC-sponsored events at the White House, or other DNC events where the President, Vice President or First Lady are in attendance, must be assessed and screened through the DNC's Compliance Division before their names are forwarded to the White House.²² The DNC also prohibits adding proposed guests to any event less than 24 hours before the event is scheduled to occur, and prohibits attendance if an individual is not legally permitted to make a personal contribution to the DNC, unless he or she is an immediate family member of an individual who is permitted to contribute to the DNC.²³

The White House also formalized screening procedures in 1997 which require White House staff to assess individuals the DNC proposes to invite to White House events.²⁴ These new procedures are addressed below.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council serves as the chief advisory institution to the President on matters relating to foreign policy and national security, coordinating foreign policy activities throughout the Administration.²⁵ One responsibility of the NSC is to organize official meetings between the President and foreign officials and other individuals in order to advance the foreign policy goals of the Administration it serves.²⁶ These events are carefully planned and organized by NSC staff.²⁷

The NSC's expertise in foreign policy has long been tapped by White House staff when other events are planned that involve the President meeting with outside individuals.²⁸ Although the NSC does not provide information about the physical risk or general appropriateness of the

individuals who come in contact with the President, it does provide, when requested, information about any foreign policy that might be implicated by such contact.²⁹

On September 11, 1997, the Committee took public testimony of Samuel R. Berger, National Security Advisor to President Clinton since March of 1997. The Committee explored the NSC's procedures for responding to requests for information from other White House staff regarding DNC-organized events. The evidence presented to the Committee established that from 1993 to 1997, the NSC's procedures in this regard followed those of previous administrations: the NSC appropriately responded to requests when they were made, but no formal structure for assessing DNC attendees was in place. During its investigation, the Committee also learned that in June 1997, the White House established a formal structure to assess individuals the DNC proposes to attend White House events where the President or Vice President will be in attendance.

Previous NSC Procedures

The NSC's primary function is to coordinate U.S. foreign policy for the President. As a result, the NSC and its staff is typically not aware of, or responsible for, meetings or events that are organized by the DNC, or any other entity unrelated to foreign policy. From 1993 to 1997, the NSC did, on occasion, assist in providing information about certain individuals who were scheduled to attend DNC events. However, the NSC's participation was sparked only when the White House staff informed the NSC of an event or specified an individual scheduled to attend an event and asked for information about any possible effect on foreign policy.³⁰

These contacts between White House staff and the NSC were ad hoc in nature and were largely driven by the White House staff's attempt to obtain information relevant to an upcoming DNC event. Typically, White House staff directly contacted the NSC staff person who was known to have the relevant expertise to provide the information sought. These contacts were facilitated by the fact that the NSC has a relatively small number of employees divided into geographic areas of expertise.³¹ Thus, White House staff often called or sent e-mail messages to Robert Suettinger, NSC's Director of Asian Affairs, to seek information about issues relating to events or individuals that may have an impact on U.S. foreign policy toward Asian countries.

Berger explained to the Committee that this unstructured system within the White House and the NSC had been carried over from earlier practices of previous administrations. Berger testified that when he entered the Administration, the NSC procedures for providing information about non-NSC events were not formalized or structured, and that he had understood that these procedures dated back at least to the Nixon Administration.³² Berger also testified that he has studied a number of historical aspects of the NSC practices,³³ which included speaking to several former National Security Advisors, and confirmed his understanding that this NSC practice had been in place for several administrations.³⁴

Berger also explained that this unstructured system is partly a result of the fact that the

NSC is not the ultimate decision-maker on questions of access to the White House complex or to the President.³⁵ Although the NSC performs important foreign policy functions for the President, Berger testified that the NSC's practice in assessing access to the President most often takes the form of providing information to White House staff, whose responsibility it is to make a final access determination after consideration of that information.³⁶ On rare occasions, Berger explained that the NSC would actually make a recommendation that an individual not meet with the President. According to Berger, when the NSC issued such recommendations, they were accepted by the White House staff.³⁷ Ultimately, Berger explained that it is the White House staff that is responsible for determining who sees the President.³⁸

Berger also testified that from 1993 to 1997, NSC vetting of non-NSC events was event-driven in that inquiries arose in the context of a specific event.³⁹ Once the event was over, no ongoing log or record of the NSC's advice or determinations was maintained.⁴⁰ These procedures, when combined with the Office of Political Affairs's practice of not independently assessing individuals and the DNC's decision to invite a few large contributors to White House events despite recommendations that they not attend, were responsible for such incidents as Roger Tamraz's attendance at DNC events even after NSC staff had recommended against it.⁴¹ See Chapter 30 of the Minority Report.

Current NSC Procedures

Based on the unstructured systems of the DNC and the White House Office of Political Affairs, the NSC did not always receive information about DNC events that enabled it to provide information or recommendations about the attendees. As a result, there were questions raised about the NSC's role in vetting non-NSC events and about how certain individuals were permitted to attend small gatherings with the President.⁴²

Berger testified that when asked to provide information, the NSC acted appropriately and that the NSC functioned in a nonpartisan manner.⁴³ He also explained that in March of 1996, in anticipation of the upcoming election activities, the NSC issued a memorandum to all NSC staff that instructed them to treat requests and contacts with individuals from political organizations as they would any other outside individual.⁴⁴

However, Berger testified that there were structural problems with the NSC vetting procedures and that formal procedures were needed.⁴⁵ Berger explained that part of the impetus for establishing formal procedures was to protect NSC officials, who had appropriately responded to requests for information from the White House, but did not have a structure in place to explain what had been done.⁴⁶ He also stated that although a small number of attendees at DNC events with the President generated controversy in 1996,⁴⁷ he had seen no adverse effect on U.S. foreign policy.⁴⁸

On January 21, 1997, Erskine Bowles, Chief of Staff to the President, requested that the NSC formulate and implement guidelines for vetting non-NSC meetings and events.⁴⁹ From

January to June 1997, Berger consulted with counsel, staff and former National Security Advisors about vetting procedures. He talked to former National Security Advisors Brent Scowcroft, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who confirmed for him that the “ad hoc” structure was the way it had been done during their tenures.⁵⁰ On June 13, 1997, Berger issued a memorandum, setting forth a formal structure for NSC vetting.⁵¹ The new procedures require all relevant inquiries to go to one individual at the NSC and that tracking and follow-up procedures be implemented.⁵² In support of this memorandum, Bowles has instructed everyone at the White House to forward relevant questions to this particular individual.⁵³ Finally, all requests for meetings with NSC staff are now forwarded to the Deputy National Security Advisor, who routes them to the NSC staff for their evaluation as to the appropriateness of the meeting.⁵⁴ In routing such requests, the Deputy NSA is required to make every effort to remove “any information indicating the individual’s partisan political support or opposition to the Administration.”⁵⁵

Other Issues

During the 1996 presidential race, while Berger was Deputy National Security Advisor, he attended several campaign strategy meetings held in the White House. The Committee explored this issue during Berger’s public testimony on September 11, 1997.

The Committee learned that Berger’s attendance at campaign strategy meetings was not unprecedented.⁵⁶ President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, was reported to be a regular attendee at campaign strategy meetings during the 1992 election.⁵⁷ In 1992, Scowcroft also traveled to Dallas, Texas as part of a campaign team assigned to convince Ross Perot not to run for President. The New York Times noted that “some historians said that Mr. Scowcroft’s journey to Dallas would be little different from appearing on a political talk show or addressing a party convention. Others said his role debased the post of National Security Advisor.”⁵⁸

Berger testified that, like Scowcroft, he had attended campaign strategy meetings during his President’s election year, but noted that he had not engaged in other political activities in support of the President’s re-election campaign.⁵⁹ He explained his attendance at the strategy meeting by stating that he “. . . wanted to make sure that in the discussion of a campaign . . . someone was there that was familiar with the President’s foreign policy record so that if an ad mentioned a trade position, or a leadership in the world position there was someone there who knew whether it was accurate.”⁶⁰ Berger also testified that his attendance at the meetings was “partly dissuasive[], to make sure that there wasn’t discussion of political issues in any serious way in those meetings, and to make sure there was no distortion of the President’s foreign policy record.”⁶¹ Berger explained that it was his opinion that “. . . there ought to be somebody from the foreign policy side of the shop that had some general familiarity with the campaign, its basic themes, its basic message, because the President in 1996 was both President and candidate.”⁶²

Berger also addressed the nature of the campaign strategy meetings. He testified that the weekly gatherings were not “small, close-hold decision making meetings” where “the small inner

sanctum ma[de] decisions,” but instead were large gatherings attended by “the President and the Vice President, Mr. Panetta, senior domestic policy people, senior people on the White House staff on communications[, and a] good part of the senior White House staff. . . .”⁶³ Berger characterized the meetings as “basically a more general briefing on where the campaign was and where it was headed for the next week.”⁶⁴ There was no evidence presented to the Committee that Berger's attendance at these meetings was anything but appropriate. Berger apparently functioned as an observer at the meetings, seeking to ensure that foreign policy issues were handled in an appropriate and objective manner.

On September 19, 1995, Robert Suettinger, NSC Director of Asian Affairs, met with Hong Kong businessman Eric Hotung to discuss Hotung's opinions on issues relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China.⁶⁵ Hotung is a businessman and the head of the Hotung Institute, which has offices in Hong Kong, New York and Washington, D.C. The primary purpose of the Hotung Institute, according to documents presented to the Committee, is to promote a better understanding between the United States and China.⁶⁶ Berger testified that meetings between NSA staff and outside individuals with insights on foreign policy issues are common and helpful in assisting the NSC to analyze foreign policy issues.⁶⁷

On September 20, 1995, DNC Chairman Donald Fowler sent a memo to Douglas Sosnik, White House Director of Political Affairs, requesting that a meeting be arranged between National Security Advisor Anthony Lake or Deputy NSA Berger and Mr. and Mrs. Eric Hotung.⁶⁸ Berger testified that he requested Stanley Roth, the NSC's Senior Director for Asian Affairs, to review this request and advise him on whether it would be appropriate to meet with Hotung, and was advised that a brief meeting and photograph would be “fine.”⁶⁹ According to documents presented to the Committee, the meeting lasted five minutes and took place on October 4.⁷⁰

During the public hearings, questions were raised regarding whether the DNC sought to facilitate Hotung's brief meeting with Berger in anticipation of a financial contribution from Mrs. Hotung, an American citizen. The evidence before the Committee, however, does not support the conclusion that Mrs. Hotung made her contributions to the DNC in exchange for a meeting between her husband and the NSC or that Berger agreed to the meeting in exchange for Mrs. Hotung's contribution. First, documents produced to the Committee indicate that Mrs. Hotung had already made a commitment to contribute \$100,000 by September 14, and that the DNC expected to receive her check in mid-September, several weeks before the October 4 meeting with Berger took place.⁷¹ Second, Berger testified that at the time of the meeting, he “was not aware that there was a Mrs. Hotung or of her financial relationship to the DNC or of Mr. Hotung's financial relationship to the DNC.”⁷² Berger also testified that he was “absolutely” certain that no one asked him to meet with Mr. Hotung in order to facilitate a contribution to the Democratic Party.⁷³

Berger explained that Hotung “has had a lot of contact with previous Presidents and with a number of prominent Members of the Senate. He's the head of a very well regarded institute on China [and was advised by staff that] he is probably more knowledgeable about China and Hong

Kong affairs than almost anybody they've talked to.”⁷⁴ Berger testified that he had “no reason to believe that he [Hotung] would misuse a photo.”⁷⁵ Indeed, the Committee learned that Hotung has never ordered or picked up the photo.⁷⁶ Finally, Berger testified that the brief meeting did not have an impact on foreign policy, stating that “in no situation” could he “perceive in any way that any campaign contributor or campaign fund-raising consideration had any influence on [foreign] policy. I say that categorically.”⁷⁷

CONCLUSION

The appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to individuals who are invited to attend events with the President is a difficult issue which asks government officials to balance concerns of security and propriety against the desire to have a White House that is accessible to its citizens and open to a diversity of viewpoints. From 1993 to 1997, the combined DNC and White House procedures for assessing DNC events was unstructured and failed to prevent certain individuals from attending events, resulting in controversies publicized in 1996. The inadequacies have been addressed within the DNC and the White House, both of which have implemented guidelines to ensure appropriate review of future DNC events and attendees.

1. Judith Spangler deposition, 5/9/97, pp. 39-40.

Q: In the Reagan-Bush White House, did the Office of Political Affairs from time to time provide lists of people to be invited?

A: Yes.

Q: Did it do so frequently?

A: May I explain?

Q: Yes.

A: That for almost every event, different offices within the White House submit names to the social secretary; names of people that they would like to have invited to a dinner or a luncheon or some type of reception, or an event.

Q: Has that been so in every White House in which you have worked?

A: Yes.

Q: That for events, receptions, dinners, lunches, events of every kind, the Office of Political Affairs in those White Houses has submitted lists of invitees?

A: Yes.

Q: So that the Clinton-Gore White House is not the first White House which has done that?

A: No.

Q: In earlier administrations did it occasionally occur that the Republican National Committee would supply names of invitees?

A: Yes, they did.

Q: Was that so in the Reagan-Bush White House?

A: Yes.

Q: Was it so in the Bush-Quayle White House?

A: Yes.

2. Exhibit 2000M: Affidavit of Colleen B. Callahan, 9/9/97, para. 4(D).

3. Exhibit 2000M: Affidavit of Colleen B. Callahan, 9/9/97, para. 4(D).

4. Exhibit 2000M: Affidavit of Colleen B. Callahan, 9/9/97, para. 3.

5. Exhibit 2000M: Affidavit of Colleen B. Callahan, 9/9/97, para. 4(E).

6. Exhibit 2000M: Affidavit of Colleen B. Callahan, 9/9/97, para. 4(H).

7. Exhibit 2000M: Affidavit of Colleen B. Callahan, 9/9/97, para. 4(I).

8. Exhibit 2000M: Affidavit of Colleen B. Callahan, 9/9/97, para. 3.

9. Exhibit 2000M: Affidavit of Colleen B. Callahan, 9/9/97, para. 4(B).

10. Exhibit 2000M: Affidavit of Colleen B. Callahan, 9/9/97, para. 3.

11. Karen Hancox deposition, 6/10/97, pp. 217-21.
12. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, p. 106.
13. Richard L. Sullivan deposition, 6/4/97, pp. 105-108; Karen Hancox deposition, 6/10/97, pp. 58-59.
14. Karen Hancox deposition, 6/9/97, pp. 52-53.
15. Karen Hancox deposition, 6/10/97, pp. 217-21.
16. Karen Hancox deposition, 6/9/97, pp. 52-53.
17. Karen Hancox deposition, 6/10/97, p. 51; see also Doug Sosnik deposition, 6/20/97, pp. 167-68, 184; Cheryl Mills deposition, 8/19/97, pp. 147-49.
18. Karen Hancox deposition, 6/9/97, p. 78.
19. Karen Hancox deposition, 6/9/97, p. 80.
20. Judith Spangler deposition, 5/9/97, pp. 39-40.
21. Karen Hancox deposition, 6/10/97, pp. 9-10.
22. Exhibit 1073: New DNC Compliance Procedures and Fundraising Manual.
23. Exhibit 1073: New DNC Compliance Procedures and Fundraising Manual.
24. Exhibit 1072: Memorandum from Erskine Bowles to All Executive Office of the President Staff, 1/21/97.
25. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 4
26. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
27. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
28. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
29. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
30. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
31. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 33; Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
32. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 6; Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.

33. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 5; Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
34. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 8; Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
35. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
36. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 6; Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
37. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
38. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
39. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 63; Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
40. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 63; Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
41. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 63-64.
42. Washington Post, 4/2/97.
43. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
44. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 33-35; Exhibit 1074: Memorandum from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to all NSC staff, 3/96, p. 4, para. 4(d).
45. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
46. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 9.
47. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 71.
48. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 8, 43, 70.
49. Exhibit 1072: Memorandum from Erskine Bowles to all Executive Office of the President Staff, 1/21/97.
50. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
51. Exhibit 1071: Memorandum from Samuel Berger to all NSC Staff, 6/13/97.
52. Exhibit 1071: Memorandum from Samuel Berger all NSC Staff, 6/13/97; Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 29.
53. Staff interview with Samuel Berger, 8/28/97.
54. Exhibit 1071: Memorandum from Samuel Berger to all NSC Staff, p. 4, 6/13/97.

55. Exhibit 1071: Memorandum from Samuel Berger to all NSC Staff, p. 4, 6/13/97.
56. Senator Glenn, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 30-32.
57. Exhibit 2002M: News reports discussed during Committee Hearing, 9/11/97 (reporting that former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft attended campaign strategy meetings and engaged in other political activities during the 1992 presidential race).
58. New York Times, 9/28/92.
59. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97, Hrg. P. 32.
60. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97, Hrg. P. 18.
61. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 18.
62. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 18.
63. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 19.
64. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 19.
65. Exhibit 1077: Memorandum from James W. Symington to Appointment Scheduler, 9/13/95.
66. Exhibit 1081: Memorandum from Don Fowler to Doug Sosnik via Karen Hancox, 9/20/95, DNC 3140633.
67. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 36-37, 42-43.
68. Exhibit 1081: Memorandum from Don Fowler to Doug Sosnik via Karen Hancox, 9/20/95, DNC 3140633.
69. Exhibit 1082: E-mail from Stanley O. Roth to Sandy Berger, 10/3/95.
70. Exhibit 1083: Appointment Schedule for Samuel Berger, 10/04/95, SUP 003038.
71. Exhibit 2001M: Memorandum from DNC Chairman Fowler to David Mercer, 9/14/95; Minority Counsel, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 41-42; Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 41-42.
72. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 39-40.
73. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 40.
74. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. Pp. 23-24.
75. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 24.

76. Sen. Lieberman, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 66.

77. Samuel Berger, 9/11/97 Hrg. P. 43.